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We investigate in depth, using predominantly analytical rather than numerical methods, the 
mechanisms triggered by a one-off debt-financed fiscal deficit in a small open economy with 
a shared currency. The economy incorporates staggered price setting and overlapping 
generations. Unsurprisingly, these cause the impact effect to be a boom, in the sense of price 
inflation and a positive output gap. However, contrary to what normally happens in New 
Keynesian models without extraneous dynamics, the boom later inevitably turns into a bust, 
i.e. price deflation and a negative output gap. Therefore, in this setting, while short-run 
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The recent resurgence of interest in fiscal policy in New Keynesian settings has elicited 
agreement that a crucial factor in its effectiveness is the way it interacts with monetary policy.1 
In a closed economy, or an open economy with an independent monetary policy, any fiscal 
policy change affects aggregate variables some of which are of concern to the monetary 
authority, and how monetary policy reacts (or not) to such variables is critical for the effect of 
fiscal policy. However, this sensitivity is avoided in a small open economy under a common 
currency because, there, a country’s fiscal policy has a negligible effect on aggregate variables 
at the level of the currency union, so that the question of how the monetary authority reacts 
does not arise.2 The independence of fiscal policy’s effects from the monetary policy regime 
thus gives this case a special character from a theoretical perspective. It is also a very relevant 
case to study from a practical perspective. In a currency union, a country has given up its 
monetary policy as an independent instrument, so that its fiscal policy becomes potentially the 
most important item in its macroeconomic policy toolkit. It is hence vital to have a deep 
understanding of the effects of its fiscal policy on the state of its business cycle. Moreover, if 
we consider a regional fiscal authority within a country, the situation it faces is essentially the 
same, so that our paper also be seen as an analysis of how a regional fiscal deficit affects the 
regional level of economic activity. 
Considerable recent attention has already been given to the case of the government 
spending multiplier, and moreover nearly always the ‘balanced-budget’ multiplier. In the 
present contribution we wish to focus instead on the role of fiscal deficits. To separate this from 
the effects of changes in government spending, we focus on deficits brought about by tax cuts.3 
In the history of thinking about Keynesian aggregate demand management through fiscal 
means, deficits and the government debt associated with them have been at least as important 
as government spending. However, to give a role to debt and deficits per se in a dynamic 
                                               
1 See, for example, Woodford (2011) and Ascari and Rankin (2013). 
2 If the issuance of debt increases the risk premium on such debt then it may affect, especially, the long-term 
interest rate; but in our formal model here we abstract from default risk. 
3 Deficits brought about by spending increases can be analysed as the sum of a tax-financed spending increase 
and a debt-financed tax cut. Since these two policies operate through fairly different mechanisms, separating them 
provides the clearest understanding of the effects at work. 
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general equilibrium context we need a theoretical framework which avoids Ricardian 
Equivalence. Whether Ricardian Equivalence should indeed be avoided can of course be 
debated. However, recent time series econometric evidence generally shows large, negative, 
tax multipliers on GDP.4 Although such work is silent on whether this is due to incentive effects 
of marginal tax rate changes, or to intertemporal shifting of households’ disposable income 
which is not offset for other reasons by changes in their saving behaviour, the latter remains a 
strong candidate as an explanation. It is the latter which is generally meant by ‘non-Ricardian’ 
behaviour by households, and this is the type of behaviour whose implications we investigate 
further here. 
There are several possible approaches to modelling non-Ricardian behaviour. A 
commonly used one in recent work is to assume a fraction of ‘hand-to-mouth’ households. 
Examining more than one approach at once is not easily feasible owing to the modelling 
investment required. The approach we adopt here is one of overlapping generations (OLGs). 
This has the merit of being grounded in the simple and undeniable fact that human beings have 
finite lives. Specifically, we utilise Blanchard’s (1985) ‘uncertain lifetimes’ version. The OLG 
approach generates an allocative role for financial assets, unlike the hand-to-mouth approach, 
in that trade in such assets permits heterogeneity in consumption levels across households. We 
believe the implications of such a role for the effects of government debt in a business-cycle 
context have been under-explored. Nevertheless, the OLG framework has been employed in 
New Keynesian open-economy models by a few authors, including Ganelli (2005) and Leith 
and Wren-Lewis (2006, 2008).5 Relative to Ganelli the innovations of the current paper are that 
the dynamics of price-setting are more thoroughly treated and that we consider a common 
currency not a floating exchange rate. 6 Relative to Leith and Wren-Lewis, the difference is that 
we focus on dissecting the mechanics of fiscal multipliers rather than on stability and 
international coordination questions. 
                                               
4 See Ramey (2019). 
5 It has also been used in a closed-economy New Keynesian framework by, amongst others, Devereux (2011), 
Annichiarico et al. (2012) and Ascari and Rankin (2013). 
6 Ganelli (2005) assumed one-period nominal rigidities, as in the the ‘New Open-Economy Macroeconomics’ 




Our main finding is that, while in this setting a fiscal deficit does, as might be expected, 
cause a short-run boom in the form of a positive ‘output gap’, such a boom has unorthodox 
features. Most notably, the boom is always followed by a ‘bust’, or negative output gap. In 
other words, the business-cycle response of the economy is non-monotonic: after impact, 
instead of the boom simply decaying to zero, it goes into reverse. The output gap disturbance 
does eventually fade to zero, but from below, not above. Therefore, although a fiscal deficit 
has a short-run benefit because it generates a cyclical upturn, it also has a medium-run cost 
through inducing a subsequent downturn. This is not a standard and well-documented feature 
of Keynesian stimulus. More typically, the expansionary impact fades away monotonically as 
prices have time to adjust. It is true that, in models with multiple sources of dynamics, like 
empirical DSGE models, a delayed perverse reaction to a demand stimulus can sometimes 
occur; but in our analysis it occurs in a setting which has the minimum necessary sources of 
dynamics to capture an expansionary impact effect in the first place. Such a business-cycle 
backlash is something which policymakers obviously need to be wary of. It does not necessarily 
mean that they should avoid deficit-based fiscal stimulus, but it does imply that they need to 
design stabilisation policy to mitigate its unwelcome downstream consequences. Second, we 
find that inflation also exhibits a boom-bust cycle, with the deflation phase starting while the 
output gap boom is still in progress. On average the fiscal deficit shock causes deflation, not 
inflation. This runs contrary to the common idea that an aggregate demand stimulus must raise 
prices.7 We demonstrate that the boom-bust cycle and the deflation are robust phenomena, 
occurring for all parameter values. We go on to explain why they are by-products of the same 
features which make the fiscal stimulus policy work at all. 
The mechanism which causes boom to be followed by bust in our model turns out to be 
the temporary nature of the boost to aggregate demand which an increase in government debt 
provides, even though the debt increase is itself permanent. The boost to aggregate demand is 
temporary because, in a small open economy with overlapping generations, an injection of 
government debt gradually crowds out net foreign assets. In the long run, the loss of net foreign 
                                               
7 A recent empirical study which also finds that a fiscal stimulus lowers rather than raises prices is by Jorgensen 
and Ravn (2018). 
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assets more than offsets the increase in government debt in terms of its effect on aggregate 
demand. In the face of prices which are sluggish to adjust, the later decline in aggregate demand 
causes a recession, even though this decline is fully anticipated. We highlight this mechanism 
by contrasting it with the case of a balanced-budget increase in government spending. This 
causes a boom which fades away monotonically, without turning into a bust. The reason is that 
the boost to aggregate demand in this case is permanent, since it does not cause crowding out 
of net foreign assets. 
Our paper is a theoretical exploration rather than an attempt to match real-world data. We 
are interested in acquiring a deep qualitative understanding of the structural mechanisms 
through which fiscal deficits may affect macroeconomic variables. For this reason we use the 
simplest possible specification which still incorporates our desired ingredients of staggered 
price setting and overlapping generations. This enables us to derive our main conclusions 
analytically, including results about the detailed dynamics. We also focus on a very basic type 
of fiscal experiment, namely a one-period debt-financed tax cut, thereby avoiding clouding the 
picture with additional sources of dynamics of a kind which could result from more ‘realistic’ 
fiscal feedback rules. Nevertheless, we do provide a brief numerical illustration of possible 
time paths, for parameter values which we consider to be relevant empirically. This confirms 
that the ‘bust’ can indeed be of significant magnitude. As regards evidence of such boom-bust 
behaviour in practice, direct testing of this is not something that we attempt. However SVAR 
estimates of fiscal multipliers exhibit a wide variety of patterns of dynamic response to fiscal 
shocks. Some of these do indeed display a boom-bust pattern: see, for example, Italy’s response 
to a tax revenue shock as estimated by Afonso and Sousa (2012).8 
The amount of literature so far devoted to studying the role of government deficits and 
debt within an open-economy New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium framework is not 
large. The approach of assuming that a fraction of households are ‘hand-to-mouth’ agents who 
have no access to asset markets has been used by, for example, Corsetti et al. (2013), Erceg 
and Lindé (2013) and Farhi and Werning (2016).9 However such work has not drawn attention 
                                               
8 This is illustrated in their Figure 9(b). 
9 Examples for a closed economy are Galí et al. (2007) and McManus (2015). 
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to the possibility of fiscal deficits causing a delayed ‘bust’, as we do here. The approach of 
assuming that only distortionary taxation is available has been taken by Ferrero (2009). While 
not denying the potential importance of distortionary taxation, in the present paper we keep the 
focus on how even lump-sum taxation, in combination with government debt, can have a 
macroeconomic impact – which is to say through its intergenerational redistribution role. 
The paper proceeds, in Section 2, by laying out the microeconomic assumptions of the 
model. In Section 3 we draw out the implied macroeconomic structure. Section 4 then uses this 
to analyse the effects of a one-off fiscal deficit, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Microeconomic Elements 
We consider a ‘small’ country which takes world output and interest rates as given, and 
where international trade in goods and assets is frictionless. The country also takes world prices 
of foreign-produced goods as given. However domestically-produced goods are differentiated 
from foreign-produced goods, so that prices of the former may be affected by events at home. 
The potentially ‘Keynesian’ nature of the macroeconomic equilibrium arises from assuming 
staggered price setting in the style of Calvo (1983). This is embedded in a dynamic general 
equilibrium framework by combining it with monopolistically competitive firms, in the manner 
of Woodford (2003), Galí (2015), and many other authors. On the other hand, the absence of 
Ricardian Equivalence, which generates the scope for government debt and deficits to have 
real effects, arises from assuming overlapping generations in the style of Blanchard (1985). 
2.1 Household behaviour 
Domestic households supply labour (L) and consume a foreign good (CF) and a composite 
domestic good (CH). We assume the economy is ‘cashless’ in that households’ holdings of real 
balances are sufficiently small that, as a reasonable approximation, their demand for money 
can be neglected. The key assumption of Blanchard (here adapted for discrete time) is that each 
household has an exogenous probability of death, 1-q, per period of time (where 0 < q  1). 
The size of the population is normalised to 1, so that in every period 1-q existing households 
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die and 1-q new households are born. By varying q we can vary the expected lifetime (= 1/[1-
q]) of a household. An insurance market is assumed in which the household agrees to cede all 
its financial wealth to the insurance company in the event of its death, in return for which it 
receives an ‘annuity’ at a gross rate 1/q on its financial wealth in every period in which it 
remains alive. A household is born with zero financial wealth, but over its life it will generally 
accumulate financial wealth (or, alternatively, debt). Households of different ages will 
therefore have different wealth and consumption levels. We use ‘s’ to denote the birth-period 
of a household. Households may also hold (or issue) bonds, (FN, in nominal terms) which pay 
a nominal interest rate i. The bonds held by domestic households are issued either by the 
government or by foreigners. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, such bonds are perfect 
substitutes from households’ viewpoint and hence they all pay the same interest rate. 
Given the foregoing, the dynamic optimisation problem of a household may be written 
as: 
maximise , , ,( ) ln (1 )ln ln(1 )
t n H F
t n s t s t s tq C C L   
 
         (1) 
subject to , , , 1 , ,(1/ )(1 )
H H F F N N
t s t t s t s t t s t t s t t tP C P C F q i F W L T       , 
 for t = n,…,. (2) 
Here, 0 < , < 1;  > 0; s  n. Note that all households face the same lump-sum tax, Tt, and 
receive the same share of profits, t, from the monopolistic firms. (1) gives the expected 
discounted lifetime utility of a household, accounting for the fact that the probability of survival 
from one period to the next is q. To enable aggregation across households of different ages we 
need preferences to be homothetic. This is achieved here by adopting a simple logarithmic 
utility function.10 
Clearly, we can separate the static problem of optimally allocating consumption spending 
between home and foreign goods from the dynamic optimisation problem. To do this, define 
the sub-utility over goods consumption as a whole as: 
                                               
10 One consequence of (1) is that there will generally be some, sufficiently old, households, whose labour supply, 
Ls,t, is negative. This phenomenon and how it might be avoided are discussed in Ascari and Rankin (2007). It is 
unappealing on grounds of microeconomic realism. However, since the negativity of some labour supplies is not 




, , ,( ) ( )
H F
s t s t s tC C C
   . (3) 
Maximising this subject to a given total nominal spending on goods, , , ,
H H F F
t s t t s t s tP C P C I  , 
leads to the following demand functions for home and foreign goods: 
, , /
H H
s t s t tC I P , , ,(1 ) /
F F
s t s t tC I P  . (4) 
The maximised value of ,s tC  is then , /s t tI P , where Pt is the domestic consumer price index, 
(1 ) 1(1 ) ( ) ( )H Ft t tP P P
         . (5) 
,s tC  is thus also the real value of spending on all goods by the household, or its ‘total composite 
consumption’. Note that the intertemporal relative price of Cs,t is the real interest rate: 
11 (1 ) /t t t tr i P P   . (6) 
We may now return to the full dynamic optimisation problem and re-express it in terms 
of Cs,t. Solving it then yields two first-order conditions which will constitute key equations of 
the model. Since these are linear in , ,( , )s t s tC L  and their coefficients are independent of s, they 
can also be expressed in terms of the aggregate counterparts of these generation-specific 






  , (7) 
1 1 1 1
1
(1 ) (1/ 1)(1 )
1
t t t t t
q
C r C q r F

   

    

. (8) 
Note that, for any variable Xs,t, the corresponding aggregate is ,(1 )
t t s
t s s tX q q X

   . (7) 
is the labour supply function, showing that desired labour supply is positively related to the 
real wage and negatively to consumption. (8) is the ‘consumption Euler equation’. As in 
Blanchard (1985), this differs from its generation-specific counterpart by the presence of Ft+1, 
where Ft+1 is the real value of households’ bond (or ‘financial’) wealth, 1 /Nt tF P .11 Observe 
                                               
11 Unlike (7), (8) is not obtained simply by replacing generation-specific variables by aggregate variables in the 
corresponding first-order condition of an individual household. Its derivation also makes use of the expression for 
an individual household’s consumption as a function of its total lifetime wealth. 
8 
 
that if q = 1 (zero probability of death), Ft+1 drops out of (8). (8) then reduces to the Euler 
equation familiar from models with infinitely-lived agents. More generally, however, q < 1, in 
which case Ft+1 has a negative effect (if Ft+1 > 0) on the growth rate of aggregate consumption. 
This ‘generational turnover effect’ arises from the fact that, every period, some already-living 
agents are replaced by newborn agents. The newborn, who have no financial assets, have lower 
consumption than the already-living, since the latter have had time to accumulate such assets. 
This therefore tends to reduce aggregate consumption growth. Alternatively viewed, (8) says 
that, for a given expected value of Ct+1 and rt+1, an increase in Ft+1 will increase Ct. Such 
dependence of current aggregate consumption, not only on expected future aggregate 
consumption and the real interest rate, but also on the country’s aggregate stock of financial 
assets, is the key feature contributed by overlapping generations. 
Above we referred to CH as consumption of a ‘composite’ domestic good. Specifically, 
we assume that the home economy produces a continuum of varieties of good, each indexed 
by z, where z  [0,1]. ,
H
s tC  is a CES sub-utility function over these: 
1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
, 0 ,[ ( ( )) ]
H
s t s tC C z dz
      , (9) 
where  (> 1) is the constant elasticity of substitution. The household faces the sub-problem of 
maximising (9) subject to a given nominal expenditure on home goods, ,
H
s tI , where 
1
, 0 ,( ) ( )
H
s t t s tI P z C z dz  . This leads to a constant-elasticity demand function for any variety, z: 
, ,( ) [ ( ) / ] /
H H H
s t t t s t tC z P z P I P
 , (10) 
where HtP  is the price index 
1 1 1/(1 )
0[ ( ( )) ]tP z dz
   . The maximised value of ,
H
s tC  is then 
, /
H H
s t tI P . 
2.2 Firm behaviour 
Domestic goods are produced by an industry which is monopolistically competitive. Each 
variety, z, is the output of a single firm with a production function ( ) [ ( )]t tY z L z
 , where 0 < 
  1 and Lt(z) is the labour input. Labour is homogeneous and traded in a perfectly 
competitive, flexible-wage, market. 
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The total private domestic demand for any variety, z, may be found by summing the 
demand function (10) across all domestic households. This leads to a function of a similar form 
to (10) but in which the ‘shift parameter’, , /
H H
s t tI P , is replaced by total domestic consumption 
of the ‘composite’ home good, HtC . We furthermore assume that there is an analogous foreign 
demand function for the domestic good variety, z, also having the price elasticity . The shift 
parameter for this foreign demand function will similarly be equal to total foreign consumption 
of the composite home good, which we denote as 
*H
tC . Moreover, in the absence of any 
barriers to international arbitrage in goods, the price of good z in the foreign market must also 
be Pt(z). Lastly, when the domestic government purchases home-produced goods, we shall 
assume that it allocates its spending across the varieties, z, in the same way as private agents, 
treating its total spending on the composite good, H
tG , as exogenous. The global demand for 
good z is hence: 
*( ) [ ( ) / ] [ ]H H H Ht t t t t tY z P z P C C G
   . (11) 
Since firm z is infinitesimal relative to the whole economy, it takes the macroeconomic 
variables 
*( , , , )H H H Ht t t tP C C G  as given when choosing its price and output. 
Staggered price setting is introduced by using Calvo’s (1983) assumption that firms may 
only adjust prices in periods when they receive a random signal permitting this, and that in 
other periods they must keep prices fixed. 1- is the exogenous probability of receiving such a 
signal. The price chosen by any firm which is permitted to adjust its price in period t is the 
‘new’ price, denoted as Xt. Since the optimisation problem of a firm under these assumptions 
is very familiar from the expositions of Woodford (2003), Galí (2015), and many others, we 
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j
j t t j t j t j t j t j
t j
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     










, 1 2(1 ) (1 ) ...(1 )t t j t t t jr r r
  
         is the intertemporal discount factor used by the 
firm,12 and 
*( ) ( / ) ( )H H H Ht j t t j t j t j t jY z X P C C G

        is the demand for its product in period 
t+j contingent on the firm having last received a price-adjustment opportunity in period t. As 
is standard, this equation says that the new price is given by a mark-up (/[-1]) over a weighted 
average of current and expected future marginal costs. 
The formula for the index of prices of all domestically-produced goods, 
H
tP , was given 
above, in conjunction with equation (10). Combining this with the assumption of Calvo-style 
price staggering, we obtain a well-known relationship between the price index and lagged 




t j t jP X
        . (13) 
Together, (12) and (13) form the key equations of the price-setting sector of the model. 
2.3 Government behaviour 
The government’s budget constraint, expressed using the composite consumption good 
of domestic households as the numeraire, is: 
1/ (1 )
H H
t t t t t t tP G P r D D     , (14) 
where Dt is the real value of government debt at the end of period t-1. We treat debt as being 
‘real’ (or ‘indexed’) debt. Hence we abstract from effects caused by unanticipated price-level 
changes on the real value of nominally-denominated debt. HtG  is real government spending on 
the composite home-produced good. Although, most of the time, we shall assume this is zero, 
we briefly consider a government spending increase in Section 4. t ( Tt/Pt) is the lump-sum 
tax levied on households.13 
                                               
12 Since there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model, the appropriate discount factor is simply the inverse of the 
product of the gross real riskless interest rates between t and t+j. 
13 An omission from the budget constraint is any seigniorage revenue. In a common currency area, such revenue 
in principle accrues to the area’s central bank, which determines the area’s monetary policy. A share of it could 
be distributed to the home country’s government. However, under our assumption of a ‘cashless’ economy, even 
if the central bank did engage in monetary expansion (which we shall not consider here), the seigniorage revenue 
generated would be zero, since holdings of real balances by households are treated as negligible. 
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2.4 Market equilibrium conditions and some elementary macroeconomic relationships 
For each domestically-produced good, z, the output must equal the sum of the total 
amounts purchased both at home and abroad. Hence 
*( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t tY z C z C z G z   , where 
*( )tC z  denotes the foreign consumption, and ( )tG z  denotes the purchases by the home 
government. An analogous relationship prevails at the level of the ‘composite’ home good 
(defined in (9)): 
*H H H
t t t tY C C G   . (15) 
Note that 
*H
tC  is a measure of the home country’s exports. 
It is useful to relate the private demands for the composite home-produced good to the 
terms of trade. We define the terms of trade as /
F H
t t tP P  . Using the expression (5) for the 
domestic overall consumer price index, we then have: 
1/Ht t tP P
        where 1(1 )      . (16) 
We can also readily show that: 
1/ ( )Ht t tC C
   . (17) 
For 
*H
tC , the demand will depend on foreign households’ preferences. We suppose these are 
also logarithmic over foreign goods and the composite home good (cf. (1)). This implies that 
foreign households will devote a constant fraction of their total nominal consumption spending 
to domestic goods. Analogously to (4) above, we may thus write the demand for 
*H
tC  as: 
* * /H H Ht t tC I P , (18) 
where 
*H
tI  is the nominal budget which foreign households allocate to spending on home 
goods. Given that the home country is ‘small’ in the world economy, *HtI  can be treated as 
exogenous. We can also write (18) as: 
*H
t tC K       where 
* /H Ft tK I P . (19) 
12 
 
K is exogenous to the home country since, being small, it also takes 
F
tP  as given. We shall 
moreover treat it as time-invariant. Overall, then, aggregate demand for home-produced goods 
is related to the terms of trade, total domestic consumption and government demand by: 
1/ ( ) Ht t t t tY C K G
     , (20) 
(obtained by substituting (17) and (19) into (15)). It is unambiguously increasing in t, 
capturing an expenditure-switching effect; and unambiguously increasing in Ct. 
In the labour market, the money wage, Wt, adjusts flexibly to equate the aggregate supply 
of labour, given by (7), to firms’ aggregate demand for it. Note that price-staggering generally 
causes a dispersion of prices across firms, and thereby a dispersion in their labour demands. 
Consequently, when labour demands are summed across firms, aggregate labour demand 
becomes: 
1/
t t tL s Y
       where /0(1 ) ( / )
j H
t j t j t t js X P
        . (21) 
st is a measure of price dispersion.
14 If there is no dispersion, as happens in a zero-inflation 
steady state, then st = 1. (21) is then just the inverse of an individual firm’s production function, 
but here applied to aggregates. More generally, when there is dispersion, st > 1. However, when 
the model is log-linearised around a zero-inflation steady state, st drops out, so in fact it will 
play no role in our analysis below. 
In the bond market, the equilibrium condition is that the aggregate demand for bonds by 
domestic households, Ft, should equal the supply of bonds by the home government, Dt, plus 
the supply of bonds by foreign residents. We denote the latter as Vt. They constitute the ‘net 
foreign assets’ of the home country as a whole.15 Hence: 
Ft = Dt + Vt. (22) 
                                               
14 It was originally defined in this way, for staggered-price models, by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). 
15 We here speak as if Ft, Dt and Vt are all positive, but they may also be negative, as occurs for Vt in the policy 
experiment studied below. 
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As earlier, all bond stocks are measured in real terms using the domestic household’s composite 
consumption good as the numeraire.16 
The accumulation or decumulation of net foreign assets arises from surpluses or deficits 
in the country’s balance of payments. The trade surplus, expressed in units of domestic 
households’ composite consumption, is: 
*( / ) ( / )H H F Ft t t t t t tB P P C P P C  . (23) 
Replacing 
*( , )H Ft tC C  by their respective demand functions, and replacing the relative prices 
by writing them in terms of t, we have: 
(1 )t t tB K C
    . (24) 
(24) is the home country’s ‘net export demand function’. It shows that a worsening of the terms 
of trade (increase in t) boosts net exports by raising export demand, while an increase in 
domestic total consumption shrinks net exports by raising import demand. Given the trade 
balance, net foreign assets then evolve according to the standard identity: 
1 (1 )t t t tV r V B    . (25) 
Bt + rtVt is the current account surplus on the balance of payments, so this says that net foreign 
assets increase or decrease over time according as there is a current account surplus or deficit 
(respectively). 
Under a single currency, the nominal interest rate is the same at home and abroad. 
However, the same does not necessarily apply to the real interest rate, which is the 
intertemporal relative price of goods. In the case of the foreign-produced good, its 
intertemporal relative price is exogenous to the home country, since the latter is ‘small’ in 
world markets. Hence, defining the foreign real interest rate as 11 (1 ) /
F F F
t t t tr i P P   , 
F
tr  
must be treated as given. The intertemporal relative price of home-produced goods, on the other 
hand, will generally be affected by events at home, since they are differentiated from foreign 
goods and so their prices are not completely tied down by world prices. Now, we previously 
                                               
16 As with government debt, we treat the debt of foreigners held by domestic residents as ‘real’, or ‘indexed’, debt. 
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defined the domestic real interest rate as the intertemporal relative price of domestic 
households’ composite consumption (see (6)). Since home-produced goods make up a 
significant part of this, it follows that the domestic real interest rate is also not exogenous. Its 
relationship to the foreign real interest rate is given by: 
1 1 11 (1 )( / )
F
t t t tr r
      , (26) 
as can be derived from the foregoing definitions. This is an ‘uncovered interest parity’ 
condition, but in real terms. It says that the domestic real interest rate can deviate from the 
foreign one to the extent that the country’s terms of trade are expected to change between this 
period and the next. 
 
3. The Macroeconomic Structure 
In this section we assemble the above elements into an apparatus suitable for studying 
the full macroeconomic effects of changing government debt. We begin with an analysis of the 
economy’s steady state equilibrium. We then present the log-linear approximation which will 
be used for the study of the dynamics. In doing so, we highlight a key property of the model, 
which is the separability of the sector consisting of net foreign assets and the trade balance. 
This is what makes it feasible to characterise the dynamics without relying on numerical 
simulations. 
3.1 The zero-inflation steady state equilibrium 
We assume the common currency area’s monetary policy ensures zero foreign inflation. 
In the domestic economy the steady state then has to be one in which domestic inflation is also 
zero, or else the terms of trade would be permanently changing. 
Note that in a zero-inflation steady state the staggered price setting has no real effects, 
because in the long run all prices have had time to adjust. Steady-state output is therefore 
essentially determined by ‘supply-side’ forces. In Appendix A, we show that the terms of trade 
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and output then each have unique negative relationships to total domestic consumption (for 
given government spending, GH): 
 = (C,GH), Y = Y(C,GH). (27) 
These arise because greater lifetime wealth of domestic households (for which C can be 
considered a proxy) simultaneously increases the demand for home-produced goods and 
reduces the supply of them. The reduced supply occurs because wealthier households demand 
more leisure and so withdraw labour supply. The combination of reduced supply and increased 
demand then pushes up the relative price of home goods in the world market, i.e. reduces . 
In a steady state it must also be the case that the country’s terms of trade, t, are constant 
over time. The ‘real UIP’ condition, (26), then implies that the domestic real interest rate, rt, 
has to equal the foreign real interest rate, 
F
tr . The latter is exogenous, and henceforth we will 
also take it to be time-invariant, denoting it as rF. 
It must furthermore be true that the country’s net foreign assets are unchanging in a steady 
state. This requires the current account of the balance of payments to be zero, or B + rFV = 0. 
In other words (and assuming rF > 0), if the country is a permanent net debtor (V < 0), it must 
run a permanent trade surplus (B > 0) in order to finance the interest on its foreign debt; and 
conversely if it is a net creditor. Given the relationship of the trade surplus to total consumption 
via the net export demand function (24), and also the relationship of the terms of trade to total 
consumption in (27), it is then not surprising to find that in a steady state a country with higher 
net foreign assets will have higher total consumption, as can be seen from: 
[ ( , )] (1 )F Hr V K C G C      . (28) 
A final steady-state relationship derives from the consumption Euler equation, (8). When 
total consumption is constant over time, this implies (along with rt+1 = r
F and Ft = Dt + Vt): 
1 1









We can think of (29) as domestic households’ steady-state demand for financial assets. It arises 
from the life-cycle pattern of asset accumulation which occurs under overlapping generations. 
To see this, note that if r (= rF) > 1/β – 1, then each household will choose an ever-rising path 
for its own consumption, since this is implied by its individual Euler equation. Given that, in a 
steady state, it faces a ‘flat’ path for its after-tax labour income, then to achieve the desired 
consumption trajectory the household has to continually accumulate financial assets during its 
lifetime. In a steady state with rF > 1/β – 1, a typical household’s financial assets thus grow 
steadily, starting from zero; but upon death they drop abruptly back to zero. In such a steady 
state the aggregate demand for financial assets is hence positive, and it is greater, the greater is 
rF. This is what (29) shows. Conversely, if rF < 1/β – 1, households accumulate debt during 
their lifetimes, and aggregate demand for financial assets is negative. Since both rF and β are 
exogenous parameters, the sign of β – 1/(1+rF) is a matter of assumption. For present purposes 
it is convenient to focus on the case where β = 1/(1+rF). Although special, this simplifies the 
subsequent algebra and our later results are not sensitive to this precise assumption. In this 
case, (29) implies simply that: 
V + D = 0. (30) 
In other words, aggregate domestic demand for financial assets is zero, in the steady state. It 
then follows that an increase in government debt (an exogenous variable, here) ‘crowds out’ 
net foreign assets one-for-one in the long run.17 
Let us sum up the steady-state response to an increase in government debt. A rise in D, 
by crowding out net foreign assets, V, reduces aggregate consumption, C. This linkage occurs 
through (28) and (30). The mechanism is that, with a fall in V, interest receipts from abroad 
decline, obliging domestic households to cut back their consumption. At the same time, being 
poorer, they also cut back on leisure and so increase labour supply, thereby boosting domestic 
                                               
17 The same result arises in Blanchard (1985) in the small open economy case. More generally, both here and 
there, if the foreign real interest rate is above (below) the domestic time preference rate, then an increase in 
government debt crowds out steady-state net foreign assets by more (less) than 100%. 
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output. The greater availability of domestic goods on world markets then lowers their price, so 
that the country’s terms of trade worsen. These linkages to Y and  occur through (27).18 
3.2 Log-linearisation, reduction and separation of the model 
The macroeconomic structural equations contain significant non-linearities. Although the 
full non-linear version of the model can be studied using numerical simulations, if we wish to 
directly inspect the linkages between macroeconomic variables using algebra then it is 
essential, for tractability, to take a log-linear approximation of the model.19 The non-linearity 
also means that the log-linearised equations are sensitive to the steady state around which the 
approximation is taken. Here we choose the steady state with zero inflation, zero government 
debt and zero government spending (the ‘reference’ steady state). Note that D = 0 implies V = 
0 in the reference steady state (from (30)), while V = 0 means that B = 0 (from B + rFV = 0). 
Once the raw equations have been log-linearised, the mathematical logic of the model is 
best revealed by reducing the resulting system of equations to one with a simpler structure. The 
details of this reduction are given in Appendix B. Its outcome is (31)-(35) below. Lower-case 
letters in what follows generally denote log-deviations, i.e. zt  ln Zt – ln ZR for any variable Zt, 




t t tv r v b    , (31) 




t t tr y  

   , ( 1
H H H
t t tp p   ;   
N
t t ty y y  ) (33) 
1ˆ [ (1 ) ] (1 ) Ht t t ty b g    
      , ( ˆ Ht tp   ) (34) 
( )N Ht t ty b g  . (35) 
                                               
18 These results are qualitatively unaffected by assuming rF is in some region either side of 1/ - 1. 
19 Log-linearisation of models with Calvo-style price staggering also eliminates some potentially interesting 
features of the dynamics, as Ascari (2004) shows. Nevertheless it is a natural first step towards obtaining a deeper 
understanding of the model’s characteristics. 
20 Further details of variables’ definitions are given in Appendix B. 
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Here (, , ) are composite parameters whose definitions are given in Appendix B. They are 
all positive, but it should be noted that  tends to zero as q tends to one, and that  < 1. 
A key feature of this semi-reduced form of the model is that it separates into two sub-
systems. The first sub-system consists of (31) and (32), which gives the dynamics of net foreign 
assets and of the trade balance. (31) is just the log-linearised version of the balance of payments 
equation, (24). Note that vt, whose evolution (31) governs, is a naturally predetermined 
variable. (32) is obtained by combining the net export demand function, the consumption Euler 
equation and the real UIP condition. Note that bt, whose evolution (32) governs, is a naturally 
non-predetermined variable. Together, (31) and (32) form a self-contained second-order 
difference equation system. Given a path for the exogenous government debt, dt+1, they can be 
used to find the perfect-foresight paths of (bt, vt) without reference to the rest of the economy. 
The second sub-system consists of (33) and (34), which gives the dynamics of inflation 
and the output gap. (33) is a typical New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) equation, 
governing the evolution of Ht . It is obtained, inter alia, by combining the price-setting 
equation with the price index equation and imposing labour market clearing. (34) is an 
‘aggregate demand’ function, albeit of an unfamiliar type. It provides a contemporaneous 
positive linkage of the output gap to the terms of trade variable, but one into which the trade 
balance and government spending also enter. (34) is essentially the inverted net export demand 
function, but from which total domestic consumption has been solved out, being replaced by 
the output gap. Noting that the terms of trade variable just equals minus the domestic price 
level, it can be seen that (33) and (34) together constitute an implicit second-order difference 
equation in Htp , but with bt as a forcing variable. Hence, having solved the first sub-system for 
the time path of bt, we can proceed to use this in the second sub-system to solve for the time 
paths of ( ,H Ht tp y ). In this way the solution of what is, overall, a fourth-order dynamical system 
is greatly simplified, making the resulting mathematical expressions amenable to direct 
economic interpretation. 
In this model, the output gap, ty  (
N
t ty y  ) behaves significantly differently from 
output itself. This is because the ‘natural’ level of output, Nty (defined as the value which ty  
would take if prices were perfectly flexible), is also affected by government debt, government 
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spending and net foreign assets, as they change over time. This occurs through the influence of 
these variables on labour supply. (35) shows that movements in N
ty  in fact follow movements 
in the trade balance and government spending. Although such dependence on bt may seem 
unintuitive, note that bt is a function of net foreign assets along the perfect-foresight path, so 
that N
ty  can equivalently be viewed as a function of vt. The details of this are discussed further 
below. Having solved for 
t
y  and N
ty , we can then, if wished, recover the solution for total 
output, yt, which is just their sum. 
 
4. Effects of a One-Period Budget Deficit 
As stated earlier, for our main fiscal policy experiment we consider a one-period budget 
deficit, implemented through a cut in the level of lump-sum taxation, t, and financed by issuing 
government debt. After the impact period, taxation is raised again in order to balance the 
budget, so that government debt (dt+1) is thereafter constant at the new, higher, level. Although 
more ‘realistic’ policy changes could be examined, we choose this one in order to reveal as 
clearly as possible the dynamic forces which are unleashed. Under this experiment, government 
debt does not continuously evolve, so the subsequent time path of the economy is driven only 
by the responses emanating from the domestic and foreign private sectors, and not by the 
dynamics of the policy instrument itself. 
4.1 Effects on the trade balance, net foreign assets and the natural level of output 
As just seen, the time paths of (bt,vt) are determined only by (31) and (32). Here, vt is 
predetermined and bt is non-predetermined. Therefore, for a unique bounded perfect-foresight 
equilibrium to exist, we need this second-order system to have one eigenvalue inside, and one 
outside, the unit circle. Appendix C demonstrates that this is always satisfied. 
We depict the equilibrium in Figure 1. The stationary loci are given by: 
1 0 : (1 )
F
t t tb b r v d      , (36) 
1 0 :
F
t t tv b r v    . (37) 
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Initially, with d = 0, the economy is in a steady state at the origin. When d is permanently 
increased21, the 1 0tb    locus shifts down. The new steady state is at point S, to which there 
is a unique convergent path – the saddlepath – given by the dashed line. On impact, the 
economy jumps onto this path at point A and the trade balance thus goes into deficit. Over 
time, the economy then converges to point S along the saddlepath. Hence, during the transition, 
domestic households steadily accumulate foreign debt, while the trade balance gradually turns 
from deficit to surplus. In the new steady state, the surplus is just enough to offset the 
continuous outflow of interest payments on the permanently higher foreign debt. 
Algebraically, the solutions for vt and bt, following a tax cut in t = 0, can be expressed as: 
1 0[ ]
t
tv v v v   , 1( 1 )[ ]
F
t tb b r v v     , (38) 
where v is the new steady-state value of vt (= -d), v0 is the pre-shock steady-state value (= 0), b 
is the new steady-state value of bt (=r
Fd), and 1 is the stable eigenvalue of the system. We can 
show (see Appendix C) that 1 lies, more specifically, in the interval (0,1).22 
It follows from the behaviour just described for bt, and (35), that the natural level of 
output (
N
ty ) also falls on impact. Along the transition path, however, 
N
ty  rises, ending up 
higher than its pre-shock level. This is directly illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 2. We can 
understand these effects as resulting from labour supply changes. The increase in government 
debt initially raises domestic households’ perceived total lifetime wealth. This is due to q < 1, 
which causes the increased current bond holdings not to be fully offset by the expected higher 
present value of the taxes during the lifetime of currently alive households. Such, of course, is 
the standard mechanism breaking Ricardian Equivalence under OLGs. Feeling wealthier, 
households demand more leisure and supply less labour. Under fully flexible prices, this has a 
negative supply-side effect on output. Over time, however, households’ wealth declines due to 
                                               
21 From the linearised government budget constraint, 1ˆ (1 )
H F
t t t t
g r d d      (where 0
H
t
g   for this 
experiment), we can see that the increase in dt+1 corresponds to a one-off cut in t̂ , while in all subsequent periods 
t̂
  will be higher by rFd. 
22 Note that the foregoing only applies when q < 1 (and thus  > 0), i.e. when Ricardian Equivalence is absent. 
When q = 1, the system exhibits path-dependence. In this case, bt = -rFv0, where v0 is the predetermined initial 
stock of net foreign assets. bt and vt are then time-invariant along the perfect-foresight path and the system is 
independent of d. 
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the accumulation of net foreign debt. In the new steady state the country is poorer than when it 
started, since it has to make permanently higher interest payments to its foreign creditors. This 
has the opposite effect to the initial shock, with domestic households now demanding less 
leisure and supplying more labour, implying an expansionary long-run effect on the natural 
level of output. 
4.2 Impact effects on the output gap, output and the price 
As explained in 3.2, the sub-system (33)-(34) which describes the dynamics of ( , )Ht ty  
amounts to an implicit second-order difference equation in 
H
tp , but one in which bt enters as a 
forcing variable. We can now use the solution just obtained for bt, (38), to re-write this as a 
self-contained third-order system in ( , , )H HPt t tp p v , where vt and 
HP




predetermined variables while H
tp  is non-predetermined. Appendix D provides details. 
Although third-order, this transformed system can easily be studied analytically because vt 
evolves independently of ( , )H HPt tp p . For a unique bounded perfect-foresight solution to exist, 
we need it to possess two eigenvalues inside, and one outside, the unit circle. In Appendix D 
we show that this condition is indeed satisfied. One of the stable eigenvalues is 1, inherited 
from the (bt, vt) sub-system. The other we will call 2. Appendix D shows that it, too, lies more 
specifically in the interval (0,1). 
We now seek to discover the immediate effect which the budget deficit has on the output 
gap, i.e. on 0y . Since the economy is assumed to start in the ‘reference’ steady state, the pre-
shock values of all deviation variables are zero. The solution which we obtain for 0y  is: 
12 1 1 2
0
1 2
(1 )[1 (1 )(1 )]







      
 
       
 
 (39) 
The derivation is spelled out in Appendix D. In this log-linearised model, the coefficient on d 
is the ‘impact multiplier’. It is clear from (39) that this is positive. Thus it is unambiguous that 
the fiscal deficit causes a boom, in the sense of a positive output gap. This is what we would 
intuitively expect: the higher government debt adds to the lifetime net wealth of domestic 
                                               
23 As well as being the lagged value of Htp , the variable
HP
t
p  can also be interpreted as the index of all prices, 
( )
t
p z , which are still in force in period t but which are ‘predetermined’, i.e. which were set in period t-1 or earlier. 
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households, and in the presence of sticky prices the stimulus which this gives to consumption 
demand pushes output above its natural level. Unsurprisingly, then, given the Keynesian 
elements of staggered prices and OLGs, the economy’s short-run behaviour is typically 
Keynesian. 
As can be seen from (39), the magnitude of the multiplier is particularly sensitive to the 
magnitudes of the two stable eigenvalues, 1 and 2. In Appendix C we show that the most 
important parameter determining 1 is q; and in Appendix D we similarly show that the most 
important parameter determining 2 is α. As q goes from 0 to 1, 1 goes monotonically from 0 
to 1; and as α goes from 0 to 1, 2 likewise goes monotonically from 0 to 1. It follows that if 
agents were infinitely-lived (q = 1), or if prices were fully flexible (α = 0), then the impact 
effect on the output gap would be zero. As 1-q and α move away from zero, i.e. as expected 
lifetimes fall and price stickiness rises, the size of the impact effect on the output gap increases. 
Although the set-up of the model would probably have led us to predict such results, here they 
are visible directly from the algebra of the solution in a clean and transparent way. 
One might also be interested in the impact effect on the absolute level of output, and not 
just on its value relative to its natural level. We saw that the natural level of output falls on 
impact. Since 
N
t t ty y y  , it follows from the foregoing that, for sufficiently flexible prices, 
the rise in the output gap will be too small to outweigh the fall in the natural level of output, 
and thus absolute output will fall. On the other hand, we can show that for sufficiently sticky 
prices, yt will certainly rise. The reason why an expansionary impact on output itself is not 
guaranteed is that the fiscal deficit has a contractionary supply-side effect, via labour supply, 
which counteracts the expansionary demand-side effect, via consumption demand. 
We encapsulate these findings regarding the impact effects on output as: 
Proposition 1. The impact effect on the output gap of a one-period debt-financed tax cut is 
positive, except when either the probability of being unable to change price (), or the 
probability of dying (1-q), is zero. It is increasing in  and 1-q. The impact effect on output 
itself is positive if  is sufficiently close to one, but negative if  is sufficiently close to zero. 
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As regards the impact effect on the price level, 
0
H
p , we can readily show that it is always 
positive except when agents are infinitely-lived (q = 1), the latter case making it zero. 
4.3 Behaviour of the output gap and inflation along the transition path 
How do the output gap and inflation evolve during the transition to the new steady state? 
We know they must eventually tend to zero. However, since the dynamics along the perfect-
foresight path are governed here by two stable eigenvalues, rather than just one, it is possible 
that this adjustment is non-monotonic, even though both eigenvalues are real and lie in the (0,1) 
interval. 
To examine this, we derive the ‘final form’ solutions for the variables of interest, 
expressing them as explicit functions of time. In the case of the output gap, the equation 
obtained is (see Appendix E for the derivation): 
1
1 1 2 2[ ][ (1 ) ]
t t
t y yy w w d    
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   
      
  
. 
Now consider the signs of the coefficients ( 1yw , 2yw ). Both have positive numerators, but their 
denominators depend on the sign of 2-1. If 2 > 1, then 1yw  is positive and 2yw  is negative; 
while if 2 < 1, their signs are reversed. Both 2 > 1 and 2 < 1 are possible within our 
assumptions. 
Suppose first that 2 > 1, implying 1yw  > 0, 2yw  < 0. Slightly rearranging (40) gives: 
1
2 1 1 2 2{ ( / ) }[ (1 ) ]
t t
t y yy w w d     
     . (41) 
The sign of the term {.} at first appears ambiguous. However, we already know that ty  is 
positive when t = 0, from which it follows that 1yw + 2yw > 0. In other words, when t = 0 the 
positive term involving 1yw  inside {.} must dominate the negative term 2yw . Since, by 
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assumption, 1/2 < 1, it is then clear that, over time, the size of the positive term shrinks 
towards zero, so that the sign of {.} must eventually switch from positive to negative. Thus the 
output gap, having started out positive, must at some point become negative. The initial ‘boom’ 
inevitably turns into a ‘bust’. It is also clear that this change of sign can occur only once. The 
boom-bust cycle is thus not repeated: output will subsequently tend to zero, but always from 
below. 
Next suppose that 2 < 1. Since the signs of ( 1yw , 2yw ) are then reversed, an exactly 
parallel argument, but this time factorising (40) by 1
t , shows that the output gap must again 
exhibit a boom-bust cycle. 
A third possibility is 1 = 2. This could only arise for a chance combination of the 
parameter values. We can show that, in this case too, a boom-bust cycle must occur.24 
Thus we have established our main result: 
Proposition 2. Although the output gap is positive on impact, it must later become negative. It 
then tends to zero asymptotically from below. This holds for all parameter values (other than 
the special cases associated with a zero impact effect). 
The general shape of the time path for the output gap is hence as depicted in panel (b) of Figure 
2. Below, we discuss what are the macroeconomic forces which result in this switch from boom 
to bust. 
Next consider the transition path of inflation, 
H
t . Using similar methods we can show 
that, having started out positive, inflation must at some point switch to being negative, and 
cannot change sign thereafter. In fact, overall, inflation must be more negative than positive. 
This last follows from our earlier finding that in the new steady state the terms of trade must 
have worsened, which means that the domestic price level (pH) must end up below its pre-shock 
value. The fact that the country is part of a common currency area is key to this. If it had its 
own currency, the terms of trade deterioration could be achieved through exchange rate 
depreciation. However, without the possibility of exchange rate adjustment, a fall in the 
                                               
24 The calculations for this case are available on request. Since there are now ‘repeated’ eigenvalues, the solution 
(42) needs to be modified. 
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domestic price level is the only way to ensure this outcome. The main features of inflation’s 
behaviour can thus be summed up as: 
Proposition 3. Inflation becomes positive on impact but later turns negative. It then tends 
asymptotically to zero from below. On average, over the whole transition path, inflation is 
negative. This holds for all parameter values (other than the special cases associated with a 
zero impact effect). 
A typical time path for inflation is illustrated in panel (d) of Figure 2. 
Both the output gap and the inflation rate therefore go through their own boom-bust 
cycles. It is notable that, as illustrated in Figure 2, inflation is very likely to go negative while 
the output gap is still positive. This is because, if we treat rF as negligible, the NKPC equation, 
(34), can be rewritten as 1( ) /
H H
t t ty     , showing that the sign-change point for the 
output gap is where inflation reaches a turning point. In the present case, this is where inflation 
is at a minimum, and thus where it has already become negative. 
4.4 The effects of a balanced-budget increase in government spending and a comparison with 
the effects of a fiscal deficit 
To understand why a fiscal-deficit-induced boom inevitably turns into a bust, as opposed 
to just fading away, it is helpful to consider instead what happens under a different type of 
fiscal stimulus policy: an increase in government spending which is tax-financed. Such a 
‘balanced-budget’ expansion has been much re-examined in New Keynesian models in recent 
years so we shall not present a full analysis here25, but it is instructive to review how it would 
perform in our small open economy model under a common currency. The relevant log-
linearised model remains that which is described by (31)-(35) above. We now suppose that in 
some period 
H
tg  is raised permanently from zero to a positive value, g
H, and that this is 
financed by an equal rise in t̂  so that government debt, dt, stays at zero. 
It is clear that the change in 
H
tg  does not disturb the (bt,vt) sub-system, (31)-(32). The 
trade balance and net foreign assets are hence unaffected. Assuming the economy was initially 
                                               
25 See Woodford (2011) for a survey. 
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in the reference steady state, bt and vt would remain at zero. The OLG structure therefore plays 
no role in the case of a balanced-budget spending change, because the effects of OLGs (i.e. of 
q < 1) are channelled through the (bt,vt) sub-system. The macroeconomic outcomes would be 
the same even if agents were infinitely-lived. The increase in government spending does, 
however, raise the natural level of output, as can be seen from (35). This is because the higher 
tax burden generated by the higher spending causes households to reduce their demand for 
leisure, and so to supply more labour. Such an expansionary supply-side effect, working 
through an income effect on labour supply, is a familiar feature of many related models. 
Turning to the ‘residual’ equation sub-system, (33)-(34), the fact that bt is unaffected by 
government spending (and should thus be set to zero) means that (33)-(34) can be used just by 
itself to determine inflation and the output gap. (33), the NKPC equation, is an ‘aggregate 
supply’ relation; while (34) is an ‘aggregate demand’ relation, and it is through the latter that 
government spending affects the system. From what has been said, we can rewrite (35) as: 
(1 ) H Ht t ty g p   , (42) 
where we recall that  < 1 (see Appendix B). Here we have a simple negative relationship 
between ty  and 
H
tp . It shows that an increase in 
H




It is a straightforward exercise to solve this sub-system to demonstrate the effects of a 
permanent increase in 
H
tg . (33)-(34) can be written as a second-order difference equation in 
H
tp , or as a pair of first-order equations in ( , )
H HP
t tp p  (cf. sub-section 4.2). For a unique 
bounded solution we need it to have a single stable eigenvalue. It can be verified that it indeed 
possesses such an eigenvalue, which is moreover the same as λ2 above. In this way the solution 





  . (43) 
This shows that a balanced-budget government spending increase produces a boom which 
fades away monotonically, in contrast to a debt-financed tax cut which produces a boom which 
turns to bust before fading away. Monotonic convergence following a balanced-budget 
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spending increase is the standard outcome in a closed economy, so it is not particularly 
surprising to find that this generalises to a small open economy. 
Now return to the case of a tax cut. As seen in sub-section 4.2, the equation system 
governing the dynamics of inflation and the output gap is again (33)-(34), with the only 
difference being that the ‘driver’ of aggregate demand in (34) is not Htg , but bt. To make this 
more explicit, re-write (34) as: 
1[ (1 ) ]( ) Ht t ty b p  
     . (44) 
Comparing (44) with (42), we note that it is as if 
H
tg  has been replaced by –bt (in either case 
multiplied by a positive coefficient) as the source of shifts in the aggregate demand relation. 
The trade deficit (-bt) is not a variable which we normally think of as a source of shifts in 
aggregate demand. However, we may notice that –bt is proportional to the composite variable 
ˆ
t tc   (as can be seen from the log-linearised net export demand function, (B2), in Appendix 
B). In turn, ˆt tc   can be interpreted as total domestic composite consumption but measured 
in foreign goods units, i.e. as /
F
t t tPC P  (after expressing it in deviation form). This is made 
apparent by writing /
F
t t tPC P  as / ( )t tC
 . Therefore if we define ˆt tc   as Wtc  (total 
domestic composition consumption in ‘world’ goods units), (44) equivalently becomes: 
[ (1 ) ] W Ht t ty c p      , (45) 
where 
1(1 ) ( )Wt tc b
    (by virtue of (B2)). 
Viewed in terms of (45), the driver of aggregate demand in the case of a debt-financed 




tc  follows a time path which is the mirror image of that of bt (or of 
N
ty , which 
is shown in panel (a) of Figure 2). Its evolution, like that of bt, is independent of the sticky-
price part of the economy. It is depicted in panel (c) of Figure 2. The increase in government 
debt at first stimulates demand as measured by 
W
tc , but over time this stimulus declines 
monotonically as the country decumulates net foreign assets, and it finishes by turning into a 
permanent drag on demand. Relative to the case of a balanced-budget increase in government 
spending, therefore, the stimulus to demand provided by a fiscal deficit is temporary. This is 
true even though the increase in government debt itself is permanent. 
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The temporary nature of the stimulus to demand, in turn, is what explains why the boom 
turns to bust. From (45) we see that, to keep the output gap at zero, the domestic price level 
would need to track the movements of 
W
tc  (times its associated coefficient) exactly: it would 
need to jump up on impact, and then gradually fall back. However, with staggered price setting, 
this is not possible. Instead what happens is that 
H
tp  lags behind 
W
tc  (times its coefficient): 
H
tp  starts to rise, but after a certain interval 
W
tc  has become negative, so 
H
tp  now needs to 
fall. Having started out too low, at a certain point the price level overshoots and becomes too 
high. At this point the boom turns to bust. This is also illustrated in panel (c) of Figure 2, where 
the time path of 
H
tp  is superimposed on that of 
W
tc  (times its coefficient). Where they cross is 
where the output gap goes from positive to negative. By contrast, in the case of a balanced-
budget increase in government spending, the reason a bust does not occur is that the price level 
never needs to fall. The stimulus to aggregate demand in this case is permanent. While price 
stickiness again causes an output gap to emerge, the price level is always too low relative to 
the source of the aggregate demand shift, and so it always catches up with this shift ‘from 
below’.26 
4.5 A numerical example 
Our model is designed to facilitate a qualitative understanding of the mechanisms at work, 
rather than to produce realistic quantitative estimates. Nevertheless one might be interested to 
know the rough magnitudes that even such a skeletal apparatus can yield, for plausible 
parameter values. We here present a numerical example which provides an idea of this. 
Although we illustrate only one case, we report how varying some of the parameter values 
alters the outcomes. The time paths of the main variables of interest can easily be computed 
using the explicit algebraic solutions obtained earlier. They are graphed in Figure 3. 
The parameter values used are given in the caption to Figure 3. One time period is taken 
to be a quarter and the deficit is set at 1% of pre-shock GDP. The value used for q implies an 
                                               
26 An alternative explanation for the bust which might initially seem tempting is to observe that taxes are first cut 
but then raised again, so the boom-then-bust in the output gap might seem just to reflect this down-then-up pattern 
in taxation. However this is not a satisfactory explanation, because households’ behaviour is based on 
intertemporal optimisation under perfect capital markets, so that it is the whole expected future time path of 
taxation, not just current taxation, which affects this behaviour. 
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expected remaining lifetime (1/([1-q]) of 5 years. This choice is guided by the consideration 
that, in the uncertain lifetimes model, it is well known that if the expected remaining lifetime 
is calibrated to a typical human lifetime, then only a trivial degree of departure from Ricardian 
Equivalence is implied. It is hence better to interpret ‘death’ as representing a broader set of 
events than just physical death. The interesting study by Bayoumi and Sgherri (2006) 
econometrically estimates q based on US data on consumption, income and taxation, and finds 
that an expected ‘economic lifetime’ of about 5 years provides a good fit. Of the other 
parameter values, α is chosen such that the expected duration of a ‘price spell’ (1/[1-α]) is one 
year.  is given a value to make the fraction of a household’s time devoted to leisure equal to 
1/3, in the reference steady state. 
Regarding the relative magnitudes of the impact effects exhibited in Figure 3, it is notable 
that the increase in the output gap dominates the decrease in natural output, such that output 
itself (which is the simple unweighted sum of the two) clearly increases. This is what we would 
expect: in the short run, the demand-driven, expansionary effect strongly outweighs the supply-
driven contractionary effect. Nevertheless the latter is not completely trivial. A lower value of 
 reduces its importance, by weakening the income effect on labour supply. 
The dynamic effects seen in Figure 3 are strongly persistent. This reflects the fact that 
both eigenvalues turn out to be high, with 1 = 0.9843 and 2 = 0.8872. As already noted, q 
and  (respectively) are the main determinants of these. For plausible values of q, a near-unit 
value of 1 is always likely, because a ‘biologically realistic’ q would raise 1 still further. If 
such a value of q is used instead, its main consequence is to scale down the absolute magnitudes 
of all the effects, but not to change the shapes of time paths markedly. As regards 2, this is 
lower if  is lower; or if  is lower; or if  is higher. However 2 is unlikely to fall below about 
0.75, for plausible parameter choices. 
The point of greatest interest is to observe the ‘bust’ relative to the ‘boom’. The plot of 
the output gap in Figure 3 shows that the bust is shallow relative to the boom. Measuring each 
at its maximum extent, the former is 3.8% of the latter. On the other hand, we can also see that 
the bust is prolonged. If we consider the cumulative loss of output as measured by the output 
gap, in the bust phase we find that it is 33.1% of the cumulative gain of output in the boom 
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phase.27 Viewed this way, the bust is of significant magnitude relative to the boom. Other 
numerical experiments confirm that, for parameter values in an empirically relevant range, the 
bust is likely to be shallow but long. The parameter to which it is most sensitive is rF, the 
foreign real interest rate. With a lower value of rF, such as 0.01, the bust becomes relatively 
insignificant, unless other parameters such as  are pushed to fairly extreme values. Both 0.01 
and 0.02, however, lie in the range of international borrowing and asset return rates which are 
broadly realistic. This therefore implies that the possibility that a fiscal deficit will be the source 
of a sizeable delayed recession is real.  
 
5. Conclusions 
We have studied in depth the mechanisms which operate following a one-period, debt-
financed, fiscal deficit in a small open economy. The economy incorporates New Keynesian 
features which capture effects which are present in simple ad hoc Keynesian models, in 
particular price stickiness and non-neutrality of public debt, but in a way consistent with 
general equilibrium principles. To do this it assumes monopolistic competition combined with 
Calvo-style staggered price setting, and overlapping generations based on uncertain lifetimes. 
Since our objective is not the quantitative one of accurately replicating a real-world data set, 
but the analytical one of being able to clearly observe the inner workings of the economy, we 
have eliminated many inessential, but undeniably ‘realistic’, features which would otherwise 
complicate the picture. However, the resulting dynamical system is still non-trivial, exhibiting 
fourth-order dynamics. 
Notwithstanding the order of the dynamics, we have been able to fully characterise the 
dynamic responses of variables to the deficit algebraically, by exploiting a separability property 
of the system. This consists in the fact that the time paths of net foreign assets and the trade 
balance can be solved for independently of other variables. Taking advantage of this, we were 
able to show that, on impact  as might be expected from the Keynesian structural 
characteristics of the economy  the fiscal deficit reliably causes a boom, i.e. a positive output 
                                               
27 This figure is reached by truncating the bust at 120 periods. 
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gap. However we also found that the boom at some point inevitably turns into a bust, i.e. a 
negative output gap. This second finding is not a well-known consequence of a fiscal deficit, 
and yet it follows robustly from the same New Keynesian structural features which give rise to 
the initial boom. The wider implications of our analysis are that, while fiscal deficits can indeed 
be used as a tool for business cycle stabilisation, they should not be used in a naive way. A 
simple one-period deficit sets off a dynamic reaction which can itself be destabilising. A careful 
plan for the future path of the fiscal deficit and public debt levels therefore needs to be mapped 
out which can mitigate the disturbance exhibited in the dynamic reaction. To do this is beyond 








Figure 1 The effects of a one-period fiscal deficit on the trade balance 






















Figure 2 Qualitative illustrations of the time paths of variables 



























Figure 3 A numerical simulation of selected variables’ time paths in response to a one-period 
fiscal deficit equal to 1% of pre-shock output (q = 0.95, α = 0.75, rF = 0.02, θ = 15, γ = 0.7, σ 



























In a zero-inflation steady state, symmetry amongst all domestic firms implies that the 
prices of all goods varieties will be the same, i.e. P(z) = PH = X for all z. The price-setting 
equation, (12), then reduces to W/PH = (1-1/θ)σY1-1/σ. This is essentially the economy’s labour 
demand function, although expressed in terms of output rather than employment. Combining 














which is the steady-state labour-market clearing condition. 
(A1) provides a negative relationship between Y and  for a given C. A second 
relationship between Y and  for a given C – this time positive – is given by the world demand 
function for home-produced goods, (20). (GH is also a parameter in this function.) When solved 
simultaneously, they determine Y and  as implicit functions of C and GH. These are the 
functions represented as (27) in the main text. 
To show why the functions (27) are both decreasing in C, we may use (A1) to eliminate 
 from (20). This gives: 
1/(1 )
1/ 1/
1/ 1 1/ 1









    
   
 
. (A2) 
Notice that an increase in Y unambiguously raises the LHS and lowers the RHS of this equation, 
while an increase in C unambiguously lowers the RHS. Hence it implies an unambiguously 
negative relationship between Y and C. To see the sign of the relationship between  and C, 
return to look at (20). The LHS is clearly increasing in Y, while the RHS is unambiguously 
increasing in C and in . Having just seen that a rise in C lowers Y, it then follows that, when 
C increases, a fall in  is necessary to maintain equality between the sides. Hence the 





A set of ‘raw’ log-linearised equations is given in (B1)-(B6) below. As stated in the main 
text, lower-case letters generally denote log-deviations, i.e. zt  ln Zt – ln ZR for any variable 
Zt, where ZR is its value in the ‘reference’ steady state. Where the variable is already in the 
lower case,  is used. In the case of interest rates, log-deviations are taken of ‘gross’ values, 
so ˆ ln(1 ) ln(1 )
t t R
r r r    , etc. Where the reference steady state value is zero, so its log is not 
defined, the ‘deviation’ form of the variable is obtained by scaling it by an appropriate reference 
steady state value: hence /
t t R
b B C , /
t t R
v V C , /
t t R
d D C , /H Ht t Rg G Y , ˆ /t t RT C  . 
Inflation rates are defined directly as 1t t tp p   , 1
H H H
t t tp p   . It is also helpful to define 
reference steady state values of the nominal ‘scale’ variables, ( , , )H Ft t tP P P . We let 1RP  , so 
(5) then implies 1H
R RP
   and FR RP
 , where R is tied down by the steady state equations. 
2 ˆ(1 ) Ht t t ty c g       [ ˆ
H
t tp   ] (B1) 
ˆ(1 )( )t t tb c     (B2) 
1 1 1 1ˆ ( )t t t t tc c r v d        [
1(1/ 1)(1 )(1 )Fq r q       ] (B3) 
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ( )t t tr       (B4) 
1 (1 )
F
t t tv r v b     (B5) 
 1 1 ˆ(1 ) [1/ 1 ( 1) / ] (1 )H F Ht t a t t tr y c                  (B6) 
 [ 1 1(1/ 1)[1 (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ]Fa r      
       ] 
(B1)-(B5) are the direct counterparts of, respectively, (27), (23), (8), (25) and (24) in the 
main text. (B6) can be recognised as a form of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) 
equation, and it arises from combining the price-setting equation (12) with the price index 
formula (13), while also endogenising the wage by equating labour supply and demand as given 
by (7) and (20). The presence of ˆ( , , )t t ty c   as separate variables in this raw form of the NKPC 
equation is due to the economy being open. 
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We now show that this equation system can be separated into two sub-systems, one of 
which is independent of the other. If (B4) is used to eliminate 
1t̂r  from (B3), we obtain: 
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ( )
t t t t t t
c c v d          . (B7) 
Notice that this is a first-order difference equation in the composite variable, ˆ
t t
c  . However, 
(B2) shows that ˆ
t t
c   has a simple negative relationship to the trade balance, bt. Hence we 
can re-write (B7) as: 
1 1 1(1 )( )t t t tb b v d       . (B8) 
This is the same as (32) in the main text. As noted there, (B5) and (B8) together form a self-
contained second-order equation system in (bt, vt). Notably, this sub-system is independent of 
price stickiness: Calvo’s parameter for the probability of a firm being unable to adjust price, α, 
is absent from it. 
Next we show how the second sub-system of equations can be re-written in terms of the 
output gap. The output gap is the difference between yt and the natural output level, 
N
ty , so we 
need to establish the determinants of Nty . Under fully flexible prices (i.e. the hypothetical 
circumstances which determine Nty ), the relationships (27), which we previously derived just 
for the steady state, in fact hold in every period. Once log-linearised, we may combine these 
with (B2) to express Nty  as a function only of bt: 
( )N Ht t ty b g  . [
1{( 1) / 1/ }       ] (B9) 
This is the same as (35) in the main text. It is notable that Nty  is determined solely by the (bt,vt) 
sub-system (and by Htg ). Given that 
N
ty  is the flexible-price output level and that, as remarked 
above, the (bt, vt) sub-system is independent of price stickiness whereas the other sub-system 
is not, we should in fact expect Nty  to be determined solely within the former. 
To re-write the NKPC equation, (B6), in terms of the output gap, we first replace 
ˆ( , , )
t t t
y c   in (B6) by ( , , Ht t ty b g ). This can be done by solving (B1) and (B2) simultaneously 
in order to express ˆ( , )t tc   as functions of ( , ,
H
t t ty b g ), and then substituting the results into 
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(B6). We next replace yt by 
N
t ty y  and use (B9) to eliminate 
N
ty . This causes bt and 
H
tg  to 




t t tr y  

   , [
1
a  
 ] (B10) 
which is the same as (33) in the main text. 
Lastly, the ‘aggregate demand’ function in the main text, (34), is obtained by combining 
(B1) and (B2) to eliminate ct, replacing yt by 
N
















     

          
       
       
. (C1) 
Let an eigenvalue of the coefficient matrix in (C1) be denoted by .  is determined by 
the characteristic equation of the matrix, namely: 
2 [1 (1 ) (1 )] (1 ) 0F Fr r           . (C2) 
This has the structure: 
2 ( ) 0a b b     , (C3) 
where a  1+(1-)  1, b  1+rF > 1. The properties of its roots, i.e. of the eigenvalues, can 
most easily be examined by graphing it. To do this, rearrange (C3) as: 
2 ( )a b b    . (C4) 
The left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS) expressions are both simple functions of 




It is easy to see from (C4) that the LHS function is a parabola which passes through the 
points (0,0) and (1,1). On the other hand, the RHS function is a straight line which passes 
through the points (1,a) (labelled A), and (0,-b) (labelled B). Given that points A and B lie on 
opposite sides of the parabola, it follows that the two loci must intersect. Hence the eigenvalues 
are real, rather than complex, numbers. Given the location of points A and B, it is also clear 
that one intersection of the two loci must occur for  in the range (0,1), while there will be 
another intersection (not shown) for  in the range (1,). Hence, as asserted in the main text, 
we have one eigenvalue inside, and one outside, the unit circle. 
Next consider how changes in the parameters (a,b) affect the size of the smaller 
eigenvalue, 1. Note that both a and b can vary between 1 and . In particular, q = 1 implies  
= 0 and hence a = 1; while as q falls towards zero, , and hence a, increase towards infinity. 
Meanwhile, rF = 0 implies b = 1; while as rF rises towards infinity, so does b. (A rise in rF in 
addition increases , and thus also increases a.) From Figure C1, it is easy to see that as a 
increases from 1 to , the line ‘RHS’ pivots anti-clockwise about point B (assuming unchanged 
b), and hence 1 falls from 1 to 0. 1 is therefore an increasing function of q, tending to 0 as q 
tends to 0, and tending to 1 as q tends to 1. On the other hand, as b increases from 1 to , the 
RHS line pivots anti-clockwise about point A (assuming unchanged a). Hence 1 rises towards 
1. 













In the main text, the relationship of bt to vt in the perfect foresight solution is given by 
(38). The coefficient which appears in this – ηb, say – comes from the normalised stable 
eigenvector of the matrix in (C1), i.e. the eigenvector associated with 1. b therefore satisfies: 
1
1







     

         
     
       
. (C5) 
The expression for b in (38) is taken from the second equation in (C5). 
Appendix D 
In this sub-section we are not concerned with changes in government spending, so we set 
H
tg  = 0 for all t. Substituting (34) into (33) and using the definitions of ˆ( , )
H
t t  , we obtain a 
second-order difference equation in H
tp : 
1 1 1
1 1(1 ) [(1 ) 1 ] [ (1 ) ]
F H F H H
t t t tr p r p p b    
  
           (D1) 
The evolution of bt in this equation is given by (38), which can be re-written as: 
1 1( 1 ) (1 )
F
t tb r v d      , (D2) 
while the evolution of vt, as also given by (38), can equivalently be expressed as: 
1 1 1(1 )t tv v d     . (D3) 
We may now use (D2) in (D1) and combine this with the definition 1
HP H
t tp p   and with (D3) 
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Again using  as the general symbol for an eigenvalue, the characteristic equation of the 
coefficient matrix in (D4) is: 
 21( ) [1 (1 ) (1 )] (1 ) 0F F Fr r r              (D5)) 
 = 1 is clearly one solution of this, confirming that the system (D4) inherits one of its 
eigenvalues from the (bt, vt) sub-system. The other two eigenvalues – 2 and 3 – are thus the 
solutions of: 
2 [1 (1 ) (1 )] (1 ) 0F F Fr r r          . (D6) 
The properties of 2 and 3 may be determined by noting that the quadratic equation (D6) 
has a similar structure to (C2), already studied above. In particular, (D6) can also be written in 
the form (C3), where ‘b’ is defined as before while ‘a’ is now re-defined as 1+(1+rF). Despite 
this re-definition it is still true that a and b can take any values in the interval (1,∞). It therefore 
follows that the characterisation performed in Appendix C can also be applied here. This means 
that (2,3) are real rather than complex, and that the smaller of them (2) lies in the interval 
(0,1), while the larger (3) lies in the interval (1,∞). Hence, as asserted in the main text, two 
eigenvalues of the system (D4) lie inside the unit circle while one lies outside. 
Consider next how 2 varies with α. For α arbitrarily close to 1,  is arbitrarily close to 
zero (see definition of ), and hence a is arbitrarily close to 1. As α falls towards zero,  
increases towards infinity, and hence a increases towards infinity. The diagrammatic analysis 
in Appendix C then implies that 2 is an increasing function of α, tending to 0 as α tends to 0, 
and tending to 1 as α tends to 1. 2 as a function of α is thus quite similar to 1 as a function of 
q. 
The first step in deriving (39), giving 0y  as a function of d, is to obtain 0
H
p  as a function 
of d. To do this, we appeal to the saddlepath solution of the system (D4), relating the t = 0 value 
of the non-predetermined variable Htp  to the t = 0 values of the two predetermined variables 
( , )HPt tp v . Written in a general form, this saddlepath solution is: 
1
0 32 31 0 21 22 0 21 32 31 22( )( ) ( )( )
H H N N HP HP N N N N N N
p p b b p p b b v v b b b b






ijb ’s are elements of the matrix of normalised eigenvectors associated with the 
coefficient matrix in (D4). More precisely, the jth column of the eigenvector matrix is the 
eigenvector corresponding to the jth eigenvalue, with the elements of the first row normalised 




ijb  coefficients in (D7) may be evaluated from the matrix equations which define 





11 (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) [ (1 ) ]( 1 ) 0
1 0 0
0 0 0 0
F F F F
N
N
r r r r
b
b
      

               
         
        
. 
From this we may solve for 21 31( , )
N N
b b  as: 
21 11/
N




(1 ) / [1 (1 )(1 )]








    
     

    
. 





11 (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) [ (1 ) ]( 1 ) 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
F F F F
N
N
r r r r
b
b
      

 
               
         
         
. 
From this we may solve for 22 32( , )
N N
b b  as: 
22 21/
N
b  , 
32 0
N
b  . 
If we now substitute these expressions for 21 22 32( , , )
N N N
b b b  (but not yet the expression for  
31
N
b ) into (D7) we obtain: 
1 2
0 2 0 0
1 31
( ) ( )H H HP HP
N





     . (D8) 
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To assist with interpreting the somewhat complex expression for 
31
N
b , notice that the 
characteristic equation (D6), when evaluated at  = 2, can be rearranged to yield: 
1 1
2 2 2(1 ) (1 )(1 )
F F
r r         . (D9) 
Using this to eliminate  from the expression for 
31
N
b , we then have, after simplification: 
1 2 1 2
31 1
1 2 1 2
( )(1 )







   
      
  

      
. (D10) 
We may now insert this into (D8). Further, given that the pre-shock steady state is the 
‘reference’ steady state, 0 0 0
HP
p v  . As regards the post-shock steady state values, we know 
that v = -d (see main text), while pH (= pHP) can be calculated as: 
1[ (1 ) ]H Fp r d      . (D11) 





(1 )(1 )(1 )








    
 
    
 
. (D12) 
Having solved for 0
H
p , the last step is to use this in (34), together with the solution for 
0b  (from (38)), to obtain an expression for 0y . After simplification this yields (39) in the main 
text. 
Appendix E 
In order to obtain the final-form solution for ty  ((40) in the main text), we first need the 
final-form solutions for the state variables ( , , )
H HP
t t tp p v . These can then be used in the 
‘aggregate demand’ equation, (34) (in which we recall that ˆt  = 
H
tp , while bt is uniquely 
linked to vt via (38)). In fact the final-form solution for vt, being part of the separable sub-
system in (bt,vt), was already given in (38). 
The final-form solutions for ( , , )
H HP
t t tp p v , which are the solutions of the matrix 
difference equation (D4), are in general given by: 
1 1 2 2
H H t t
tp p w w    , (E1) 
10 
 
1 21 1 2 22 2
HP HP N t N t
tp p w b w b    , (E2) 
1 31 1 2 32 2
N t N t
tv v w b w b    . (E3) 
Values for the 
N
ijb  coefficients were presented in Appendix D. The remaining unknowns are 
the weights (w1,w2). These are determined by the initial conditions for the two predetermined 
state variables, ( , )
HP
t tp v . As explained in the main text, under our assumed policy experiment 
these initial conditions are 0 0 0
HU
v p  . If we apply these to (E2) and (E3) we may now solve 
for (w1,w2) as: 
1 31(1/ )
N
w b d , 
 12 2 1 31[ (1 ) ] 1/ ( )F Nw r b d        . 
(Here 31
N
b  has not yet been substituted out, but this can be done using (D10).) 
As just noted, from (34) and (38) we may write: 
1
1 1[ (1 ) ][( 1 ) (1 ) ]
H F
t t ty p r v d    
         . 
Using (E1) and (E3) in this, together with the expressions already provided for their constituent 
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